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Abstract
This article is about risk. Risk is probably the most misunderstood
component in determining therapeutic intervention; however, it is
probably the most relevant issue to consider in the context of
expected benefit. The rarity of quantitative risk–benefit assessment
and the lack of comparative risk–benefit when alternative therapies
exist for a given condition leads to inadequate decisions. Without
some quantitation of the risks associated with specific therapies,
doctors and patients cannot make optimal risk–benefit
calculations. Patients may abandon effective therapies for which
benefits may still outweigh risks, or opt for therapies with less well-
publicized potential adverse events of even greater frequency or
severity. When only small incremental benefits accrue to patients
from the use of a given therapy, on the other hand, even very rare
serious events may play a role in decision-making by patients, by
their health care providers and by regulatory authorities.
Risk is inherent to essentially all drug therapy. Any
pharmacological therapy is likely to have some risk of adverse
effects in some patients. If an adverse event is mild and
reversible it generally is not a significant issue in the choice of
drug therapy for clinicians or patients. If the potential adverse
event is considered severe and/or serious, however, it
becomes more relevant to therapeutic decision-making [1]. If
any risk were unacceptable then new drug development
would halt [2]. This is often not very clear to patients, to
oversight government committees or even at times to
practicing clinicians. The recent firestorm associated with the
extensive risk assessment of the COX-2 selective inhibitors
(coxibs) has clearly demonstrated the dilemma. Patients rely
upon their health care providers to prescribe therapies that
will benefit them and will not place them at risk for a drug-
induced adverse event. Even with the empowered general
public of the twenty-first century there is still the implied
contract with the physician that they are able to determine the
appropriate and safe therapy for a patient’s specific problem.
Conveying risk to the patient while allowing them to
understand the decision-making process leading to the use
of the specific therapy remains daunting. The issue of the
relative risk for a therapeutic in the context of its relative
benefit should nonetheless continue to drive this process of
assigning drug therapy to patients.
A generic and daunting vulnerability in drug development
worldwide is the lack of quantitative risk–benefit assessment
and the lack of comparative risk–benefit when other therapies
exist for a given condition. Without some quantitation of the
risks associated with specific therapies, doctors and patients
cannot make an optimal risk–benefit calculation. Patients may
forgo effective therapies for which benefits may still outweigh
risks; or may opt for therapies with less well-publicized
toxicities of even greater frequency or severity. When only
small incremental benefits accrue to patients from the use of
a given therapy, on the other hand, even very rare serious
events may play a role in decision-making by patients, by their
health care providers and by regulatory authorities. It is
critical that serious drug toxicity be adequately quantitated to
inform the process of decision-making regarding medical
therapy. Frequent but trivial adverse effects are well studied
and communicated currently in drug labeling. It is the rare but
serious or severe adverse effects that represent the unmet
challenge today.
Nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) are one of the
most commonly used classes of drugs. Unfortunately the
effect size on pain is relatively modest, and in clinical trials of
severe postoperative pain most patients require rescue
medications. During the last decades of the twentieth century
when these drugs were developed, careful studies of drug
safety were relatively small and therefore it took a decade or
more for the medical community to understand the
uncommon but serious risks of chronic NSAID use on the
gastrointestinal tract and blood pressure. Despite the current
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widely disseminated risk information, these drugs are among
the most widely used over-the-counter medications. The
risk–benefit perception in the medical community and of the
public remains a positive one to justify such broad use of
these drugs. Interestingly, only with the development of the
coxibs have high-quality randomized, prospective, controlled
long-term safety databases become available on naproxen,
ibuprofen and diclofenac as well as on the newer coxibs.
The precedent for ‘large simple safety trials’ has been set
[3,4]. The value of such studies is highlighted by the
identification of cardiovascular risk of high-dose rofecoxib in
the VIGOR trial, in which rofecoxib 50 mg/day was observed
to have a fivefold higher risk of a nonfatal myocardial infarction
as compared with naproxen [4] in rheumatoid arthritis patients.
In the CLASS trial, which was a large simple trial to assess the
risk of celecoxib 800 mg/day, no such cardiovascular risk was
identified compared with ibuprofen or diclofenac [3]. Placebo
control in these studies was absent since arthritis patients
cannot go untreated for the extended duration of chronic
safety studies. Cardiovascular risk was not the primary
endpoint in either of these large studies. It is only with careful,
large, long-term safety studies that uncommon and or
unanticipated risks can be adequately studied.
Gastrointestinal risk of NSAIDs took decades to understand.
Not so with coxibs. Within several years of approval, multiple
large safety trials were completed comparing several of these
drugs with nonselective NSAIDs. Risk perceptions associa-
ted with coxibs (selective NSAIDs) have essentially replaced
the slowly accumulated previous concerns of risk associated
with the nonselective NSAIDs. It is very difficult for physicians
and patients to manage competing risks when shaping
risk–benefit perceptions. This remarkable fact has escaped
major public awareness.
The NSAID story demonstrates that risk assessment is not a
static process. It begins before a human is exposed to a new
experimental drug and continues throughout drug
development into postmarketing broad exposure once
approved. It is impossible to identify all possible risks for all
possible users based on exposure in several hundred to
several thousand subjects during drug development. Although
critics of drug development believe that many typical examples
of patients are not included in studies of a potentially new
therapy, it would be unethical to enroll very sick patients who
are most vulnerable to possible adverse events before a drug
is found to be effective. If the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) held back approvals until study had occurred in patients
on all possible cotherapies and with all possible comorbidities,
drug development would not be feasible. Knowledge of a new
drug once approved may be extensive by current guidelines
but ultimately imperfect at the time of FDA approval.
There are guidelines to require a reasonable safety
assessment before marketing drugs. The International
Conference on Harmonization, an ongoing conference
including the FDA as well as European and Japanese drug
regulatory agencies, has issued a guidance document that
discusses safety assessment in drug development. Drugs for
chronic use should be supported by safety analysis in at least
300–600 subjects for 6 months and in 100 subjects for 1 year.
Frequent adverse events (>1%) can be identified before
approval. Based on the ‘rule of 3s’ [5], if no events are seen
in 300 exposures then the true event rate is below 1/100 or
1% (with 95% certainty). For an event that has a relatively
high background rate, such as heart disease or cancer, a few
events in a database of several hundred subjects may not be
adequate to signal a drug-related serious toxicity. It can be
quite difficult to assess the meaning of differences in low
frequency events that are not a prespecified endpoint of any
given study. For instance, is there a true difference in risk of a
life-threatening adverse event between placebo and drug
therapy if rates seen in clinical trials are 0.4% and 0.8%,
respectively? In studies based on minimal current guidelines
for drug development one could not know whether these
results were random events. Yet if reflective of a true
doubling of risk, this finding would be of significant concern
for life-threatening events such as myocardial infarction or
sepsis. It would require a well-controlled study of a very large
number of subjects over time to interpret these results. For
events that have extremely low spontaneous background
rates, such as acute liver failure, a single event indicates a
probable drug effect but will probably not be seen in the first
several hundred to several thousand of exposures in pre-
approval clinical trials. It would take tens of thousands of
subjects exposed to a therapy to robustly assess rare,
serious, but important, drug-related risk.
There is research underway to identify early or surrogate
markers for serious toxicity to deal with this dilemma but such
research will take years to impact drug development [6]. In
summary, without large outcome studies involving many
thousands of subjects for months to years, it is currently
impossible to numerically assess small but potentially
important risks of drug therapy.
Beyond the premarketing assessment of safety, additional
safety information comes mostly from pharmacovigilance.
Pharmacovigilance is defined as ‘all observational (non-
randomized) postapproval scientific and data gathering
activities relating to the detection, assessment and under-
standing of adverse events’ [7]. This includes the use of
pharmacoepidemiologic studies.
In 2004 the FDA published a series of draft guidances for
pharmaceutical companies to use both before and after
initiating drug marketing. The Code of Federal Regulations
that governs the regulation of new drugs has required drug
manufacturers to collect postmarketing safety information that
is available on their marketed product and to submit such
reports to the FDA. In addition, any person can report anPage 3 of 4
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adverse event directly to the FDA through the MEDWATCH
system, which has evolved from a paper system years ago to
an Internet-based computerized database system. Reports
take only several minutes to complete and submit [8]. All
reports are now entered into a computerized database called
the Adverse Event Reporting System, which has over
6 million reports and is growing by about 300,000 reports
per year. This is a passive/voluntary reporting system that is
designed to identify signals for unexpected adverse events.
The term ‘signal’ does not have a highly specific meaning but
generally refers to the identification of an adverse event that
may be reported at a rate in excess of what would be
expected. A single report can constitute a signal for extremely
rare events such as acute liver failure or rhabdomyolysis. With
a common problem such as cardiovascular disease, however,
such uncontrolled passive reporting offers little to no value.
There are attempts being made to develop a statistical study
of the Adverse Event Reporting System database through
datamining programs that may allow for rapid postmarketing
quantitative assessment of unanticipated risks [9,10]. Large
outcome trials that recruit patients at some risk, however, may
currently be required to understand the possible causal
effects of some therapies.
Commonly used NSAIDs and coxibs do not alter the natural
history of any disease for which they are labeled. Interestingly,
however, celecoxib was approved for use in familial
adenomatous polyposis based on the surrogate endpoint of
decrease in the number of adenomatous polyps in relatively
short-term studies [11]. One should not underestimate the
importance of palliation, especially when there are limited
options, each of which is associated with serious adverse
events. For NSAIDs the risk for gastrointestinal bleeding is
relatively low, particularly if used on an ‘as needed’ basis.
With the extraordinarily large use of these drugs, however,
absolute rates for these potential events are high [12].
Premarketing understanding of major biologic effects of new
therapies and large carefully performed studies of new
therapies simultaneously with widespread use offers the best
approach to rapid development of the most accurate
risk–benefit assessment. The media has unfortunately not
advanced the public’s understanding of the complex
challenge of risk assessment and risk–benefit calculation by
suggesting that the regulatory bodies around the world have
not been doing their job of oversight; that all pharmaceutical
companies making these products have sold these medicines
without conscience, knowing that there was risk, and worked
hard to keep that information from health care providers, the
regulatory agencies and the public to preserve their profits;
and that providers have not been doing their jobs as
advocates for the patients in terms of providing safe and
effective therapies.
Interestingly, careful analysis of existing data using the
nonplacebo-controlled randomized controlled trials of the
CLASS and TARGET studies as well as extensive
epidemiologic studies using healthcare databases was
presented to an FDA advisory committee in February 2005
[13,14]. These data suggest that ibuprofen, naproxen and
diclofenac all possess similar hazard rates as two of the
coxibs, celecoxib and lumiracoxib, when used for up to 1 year.
The risk over longer term use is less well understood,
however. It took polyp prevention studies of 2–3 years
duration to indicate that risk may increase over long-term
chronic use compared with placebo in studies [15]. Such
data only exist for naproxen (at lower dose), celecoxib and
rofecoxib. This has led the FDA to issue a requirement that all
nonselective NSAIDs and all selective NSAIDs should have a
‘box warning’ within their product label identifying
cardiovascular events of stroke, acute myocardial infarction,
sudden cardiac-related death and congestive heart failure as
a risk of use for these drugs, in addition to the potential for
gastrointestinal adverse events.
NSAIDs will continue to be an important drug class in the
treatment of arthritis and other causes of pain for the
foreseeable future. The past decades have witnessed multiple
changes in the public’s risk perception of these drugs: a low
risk of nonselective NSAIDs compared with aspirin in the
1970s to early 1980s; a growing understanding of
gastrointestinal toxicity in nonselective NSAIDs in the 1980s
and 1990s; a high-risk perception for nonselective NSAIDS
and a low-risk perception for coxibs in the late 1990s to 2001;
and a high-risk perception for coxibs and an unclear risk
perception for nonselective NSAIDs from 2001 to the present.
Competing risks of gastrointestinal and cardiovascular
conditions have added further confusion regarding the
understanding of the overall relative risk to benefit of these
therapies. This ‘yo-yo’ reflects evolving science, diminished
public tolerance of uncertainty and risk, and changing risk–
benefit perceptions influenced by physicians, pharmaceutical
companies and the media
Hopefully, the NSAID experience will yield a better permanent
sophistication on the part of physicians and the public in
understanding the inevitable competing risks and benefits of
medical therapy and the inherent uncertainties in the current
paradigm of drug development.
For the practicing clinician confronted by a patient who
needs an analgesic for osteoarthritis, the choices for therapy
appeared quite simple until several years ago [15]. Physical
measures such as exercise, support devices, modified
activities of daily living along with cognitive therapies, and
thermal modalities are suggested. The pharmacologic
therapies are titrated upward based on perceived potency/
risk. These therapies include acetaminophen, NSAIDs (coxibs
if the patient was at risk of upper gastrointestinal complica-
tions, such as prior peptic ulcer disease, gastrointestinal
bleed, anticoagulant therapy, cardiovascular disease and
Available online http://arthritis-research.com/content/8/2/105advanced age that would increase the morbidity of an acute
upper gastrointestinal bleed) and opioids.
The medical literature estimated that over 15,000 deaths per
year and over 100,000 hospitalizations per year were
attributed to nonselective NSAIDs. With the evidence of lower
rates of upper gastrointestinal ulcers associated with coxib
use compared with nonselective NSAID use, the major reason
for continued use of nonselective NSAIDs after initial approval
of celecoxib and rofecoxib was cost. After publication of the
results of the VIGOR trial, comparative safety became less
clear between nonselective NSAIDs and coxibs.
Results of the placebo-controlled polyp prevention studies
with rofecoxib, celecoxib and naproxen became public in late
2004. These studies showed an increased risk of
cardiovascular disease with chronic use of coxibs and
naproxen. The entire field of relative NSAID safety entered a
period of upheaval that continues to this day. The previously
established risk of gastrointestinal adverse events with
nonselective NSAIDs must still be considered, but now the
cardiovascular risk including hypertension as well as ischemic
events is added to the mix. Will intermittent use or on-
demand use of NSAIDs/coxibs minimize the risk of serious
adverse events? Will the co-use of low-dose aspirin and
coxibs minimize cardiovascular toxicity but preserve some
coxib gastrointestinal safety advantage? Will proton pump
inhibitor co-use with nonselective NSAIDs adequately protect
against gastrointestinal toxicity even in high-risk patients? The
absence of robust comparative studies of these alternative
strategies prevents quantitative comparative assessment of
the risk of serious gastrointestinal and cardiovascular
disease. Once again we are reminded that risk–benefit
assessment is not a simple task, and that individual physician
and patient risk perception must guide choices in analgesic
NSAID therapy.
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